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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
grounds, its future effects are not so readily ascertainable. New York
apparently has adopted a case-by-case approach that seeks to remove
all the inconsistencies and unfairness of collateral estoppel, while re-
taining its viability. The case-by-case approach has been adopted else-
where and appears at the present time to be the "ideal standard. 79
The full-and-fair opportunity, applied on a case-by-case basis, appears to
be the most practicable way of achieving Judge Keating's aim of elim-
inating repetitious litigation, while avoiding the prejudicing of the
litigant's rights. If the "standard of fairness test" is applied consistently
by the courts, without recourse to the rule of thumb approaches of the
past, 0 the factors determinative of fairness mentioned by Judge Kea-
ting are definitive enough to be viable. However, the question arises
whether the lack of certainty inherent in the imposition of the case-
by-case approach might cause the opposite result hoped for, namely,
that a number of parties would seek to show that they would be prej-
udiced by the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. While
this might be true initially, this type of litigation would not be as ex-
tensive as a trial on the merits. As case law developed explaining what
constitutes a fair opportunity the total of litigations would diminish.
When viewed in this light, the overruling of Glaser becomes secon-
dary to the Court's espousal and hoped for adoption of a "full-and-fair
standard." The indecisiveness of the lowier courts as to the applicability
-of Glaser as precedent has been settled. However, the discretion left to
the courts in determining a "full-and-fair opportunity" can result in
even more confusion than existed prior to Schwartz.
In any event, the practitioner representing a person in the posi-
tion of Dl must now ensure that his client initiates the negligence
action as soon as possible after the accident so that the client appears
to be the primary plaintiff and will therefore be in a better position
to control the litigation.
CPLR 3216: Departments divided on rule's constitutionality.
The constitutional validity of CPLR 321681 has been denied in
Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations,82 where by a 3-2 decision the majority
79 Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 281 (1957).
80 These past approaches have been: mutuality, defensive use only, and use allowed
only when the party it is being invoked against was the plaintiff in the prior suit.
81 CPLR 3216 sets forth the requirements for a motion to dismiss. There are three
conditions precedent which must be met before a party may seek such a motion: (1) issue
must be joined; (2) one year must elapse from the joinder of issue; and, (3) a forty-five day
demand must be served upon the complainant, and a default in compliance with that
demand must occur.
82 30 App. Div. 2d 74, 289 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Ist Dep't 1968). For a detailed discussion of
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held 3216 to be unconstitutional in part because it deprived the courts
of their inherent power to control their calendars. The holding in
Cohn has been followed in a later first department case.83 Aside from
the manifest split among the justices who took part in Cohn, it is ap-
parent that the entire first department is split on the issue of 3216's
constitutionality, and it has been noted that the determination is de-
pendent upon which five justices happen to be sitting for the oral
arguments that day.84
In Kull v. City of New York,85 the second department preemp-
torily dismissed any question of unconstitutionality in a memorandum
decision: "Insofar as this holding is inconsistent with Cohn . . . , we
choose not to follow that case. It is our determination that the pro-
visions of CPLR 3216 are constitutional." s6
In the fourth department the validity of Cohn was first questioned
in Johnson v. Parrow,8 7 wherein the court relied upon article VI, sec-
tion 30, of the New York State Constitution as support in finding 3216
to be constitutionally valid. Furthermore, in Foisy v. Penn Aluminum
Inc.,88 the appellate division did not mention the constitutional issue,
thereby impliedly sanctioning the rule's constitutionality.
It should therefore be noted that while both the second and
fourth departments have ruled in favor of 3216's constitutional valid-
ity, the first department decision, even though by a divided court,
creates a degree of uncertainty in regard to action taken pursuant to
the rule. Until the Court of Appeals rules on Cohn there will be no
definite word on the soundness of the rule.8 9
If Cohn is upheld by the Court, the validity of the entire CPLR
will theoretically be placed in jeopardy, since Cohn stands for the
proposition that a court has inherent power to control its own calen-
dar - a purely procedural question. However, the entire CPLR is
this holding see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 304 (1968). See also The
Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 302, 330-31 (1968).
88J. E. Schecter Corp. v. Eastern Steam Specialty Co., N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1968, at 2,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).
84 For an extended discussion of the positions of the various justices in the first
department see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 304-06 (1968).
85 31 App. Div. 2d 638, 295 N.Y.S.2d 959 (2d Dep't 1968).
86 Id., 295 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
87 56 Misc. 2d 863, 864, 291 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177-78 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1968).
See also The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. R.xv. 498, 517 (1968).
88 31 App. Div. 2d 783, 296 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (4th Dep't 1969).
89 The unconstitutionality of 3216 was hinted at by the Court of Appeals in
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lafayette, 17 N.Y.2d 367, 218 N.E.2d 272, 271 N.Y.S.2d
212 (1966), where the Court avoided the question but alluded to "strong support" in regard
to its unconstitutionality. See also 7B McKiNNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 248,
251 (1965-66); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 279, 312-16
(1966).
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merely a legislative enactment intended to regulate practice and pro-
cedure in the courts. It is submitted that the legislative rule-making
power is constitutionally valid under article VI, section 30, of the
New York State Constitution.
Collateral Estoppel: Third department abandons unity requirement.
In Albero v. State,90 plaintiff brought suit in the Court of Claims
for personal injuries allegedly suffered due to the state's negligence in
maintaining highways. The state made a motion to dismiss under
CPLR 3211(a) on the grounds that there existed a judgment against
the plaintiff for his negligence in the same accident upon which his
claim was based.
In the prior federal court action, Albero was the defendant and
the plaintiffs were the driver and passengers who were hit by Albero's
auto when it jumped the divider on a state highway. In that action, it
should be noted that Albero was unable to start a third-party action
against the state since the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction
in determining the liability of the state. It appears from both the
Court of Claims and third department opinions that in the federal
court action Albero had tried to introduce evidence that it was the
state's negligence, and not his, which had been the proximate cause of
the accident. However, it was determined by the federal jury that Al-
bero's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.91
The third department's opinion is in conformity with New York's
continuing trend towards liberal use of collateral estoppel. 92 While
Albero was decided before Schwartz v. Public Administrator,93 it ap-
pears that the Albeio decision meets the requirements for the use of
collateral estoppel as set down by Schwartz. Specifically, there must be
an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior ac-
tion and is decisive of the present action, and, secondly, there must
have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said
to be controlling. In applying these standards, it would appear that
Albero had the opportunity to show his freedom from liability and
90 31 App. Div. 2d 694, 295 N.Y.S.2d 965 (3d Dep't 1969). For the Court of Claims'
disposition, see 56 Misc. 2d 235, 289 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Ct. Cl. 1968); see also The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 302, 35-36 (1968).
91 Upon the excerpts of the record of the trial in the federal court, the Court of
Claims was unable to determine whether or not the evidence offered by Albero was con-
sidered by the jury, but it based its decision upon the instructions by the court and the
jury verdict. 56 Misc. 2d at 238-39, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18.
92 See Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1969); DeWitt Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
See also pp. 144-51 supra.
93 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 NXE.2d 725, 298 N.YS.2d 955 (1969).
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